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Patriarch Kirill’s game over Ukraine
Katarzyna Jarzyńska
The protests on Kyiv’s Maidan which commenced in November 2013, followed by the con-
flict in Ukraine’s eastern regions, have redefined the political and social relations between 
Russia and Ukraine, and have added complexity to the dependences between the Orthodox 
Churches operating in the two countries. The Kremlin’s policy has put the Russian Orthodox 
Church–Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) in an awkward position. The ROC is Russia’s largest reli-
gious organisation, which also exercises symbolic sovereignty over Ukraine’s most numerous 
Orthodox community, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), which 
since 13 August has had a new leader, Metropolitan Onufry. 
The head of the ROC, the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, Kirill, has been facing a di-
lemma as to how he should respond to the Russian government’s aggressive policy towards 
Ukraine. His firm support of the Kremlin’s moves in Ukraine, may lose the Russian Church its 
social influence in this country. This might also catalyse a process within which Ukraine’s larg-
est Orthodox Church would gradually become independent of Moscow. On the other hand, 
if he condemns the Kremlin’s policy, this would adversely affect the co-operation between 
‘the altar and the throne’ which has been rapidly developing over the past few years in Russia, 
and which has offered multiple benefits to the Russian Church.
As a result, Patriarch Kirill has distanced the ROC from the recent developments in Ukraine 
and has adopted a neutral stance. However, Kirill’s choice has aggravated the negative per-
ception of the ROC among the Orthodox community in Ukraine. Given its close relations with 
the Kremlin, the ROC is increasingly viewed there as an instrument of political struggle and 
an exponent of the Russian government’s interests. The ROC’s stance has cast the UOC–MP, 
which has links with the Russian Church, in an unfavourable light, and has fostered its efforts 
to become more independent from the Moscow Patriarchate.
Regardless of how the situation evolves, the recent developments in Ukraine have made it 
clear that the interests of the Russian Church and the Kremlin, which have coincided for 
years, now come into conflict, mainly due to the disagreement over the methods used. 
Despite this, the Russian Church is not withdrawing from the cooperation of ‘the altar and 
the throne’, and submits itself to the Kremlin’s decisions.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church– 
–Moscow Patriarchate
The Russian Orthodox Church holds symbolic 
supremacy over the largest structure in Ukrain-
ian Orthodoxy, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP). This is the only 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine which is recognised 
as a canonical (legitimate) church by the global 
Orthodox community. The UOC–MP is institu-
tionally the strongest and the largest Orthodox 
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Church in Ukraine1. Its jurisdiction extends to 
around 13,000 parishes and between six and 
nine million members2. Ethnic Ukrainians pre-
dominate among the bishops and members of 
this church. It is now headed by Metropolitan 
Onufry, who was elected new primate of the 
UOC–MP on 13 August 2014. He had already 
performed the duties of the head of the church 
while Metropolitan Volodymyr was still alive3. 
Onufry was viewed from the very beginning as 
Volodymyr’s most likely successor. He has been 
viewed as a continuator of his predecessor’s 
balanced stance, which on the one hand envis-
aged a deepening of the UOC–MP’s autonomy, 
while on the other maintaining the canonical 
links with the Moscow Patriarchate.
The UOC–MP is formally a part of the Mos-
cow Patriarchate and is not an autocephalous 
church4. However, it has extensive autonomy 
as regards administration and financial issues. 
This autonomy allows local bishops, who are 
members of the local synod, to choose the 
UOC–MP’s head themselves. Moscow has 
no formal instruments to influence this deci-
sion-making process, and it only has to approve 
of this choice. The bond with Moscow means 
that the head of the UOC–MP is a permanent 
member of the Holy Synod of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, the key collegial body of the 
Moscow Patriarchate. The links between the 
two Churches have also include the informal in-
1 In addition to this Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (which is in conflict with the 
Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Or-
thodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 
operate in Ukraine.
2 Data quoted by Metropolitan Antoni in an interview for 
the Unian-Religions agency, 9 April 2014, http://ortho-
doxy.org.ua/data/intervyu-mitropolita-antoniya-uni-
an-religii.html 
This data is estimates. It is difficult to state the current 
number of Ukrainian church members due to the iden-
tity-building processes observed among the Ukrainian 
public.
3 Volodymyr, who died on 5 July 2014, was unable to lead 
the UOC–MP in the last years of his life due to health 
problems. 
4 Autocephaly means the independence of the local 
Church from other Churches. This concerns organisa-
tional forms, religious customs, liturgy, hierarchy and 
church judicature and legislation. 
fluence of The Russian Church on some of the 
Ukrainian bishops, especially representatives of 
the oldest generation. However, these depend-
ences are losing importance in view of the con-
flict in eastern Ukraine. 
Two opposite tendencies have been apparent 
within the UOC–MP for years: building closer 
relations with Russian Orthodoxy vs. becoming 
more independent from the Moscow Patriar-
chate, and in the longer run gaining autoceph-
aly and building one national Church in Ukraine. 
However, the UOC–MP has rejected any uni-
fication proposals from the other Ukrainian 
Churches5. As a consequence of the conflict in 
Ukraine, anti-Russian sentiments and the desire 
for independence within the Ukrainian Ortho-
doxy have gained strength.
Given the Kremlin’s aggressive policy towards 
Ukraine, opinions that the UOC–MP should 
leave Moscow’s jurisdiction, according to the 
principle of ‘independent country, independ-
ent Church’, have been expressed more fre-
quently among the hierarchs of the Church. 
Furthermore, those who want Ukraine to de-
velop in a European direction have also started 
sharing their views in public. One sign of this 
tendency was the fact that the Holy Synod of 
the UOC–MP appointed a special commission 
for dialogue with other Ukrainian Orthodox 
5 For more see T. Olszański, ‘Summary: The Western Bor-
derlands. The place of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in the 




Given the Kremlin’s aggressive policy to-
wards Ukraine, opinions that the UOC–MP 
should leave Moscow’s jurisdiction, 
according to the principle of ‘independ-
ent country, independent Church’, have 
been expressed more frequently among 
the hierarchs of the Church. 
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Churches in February this year. The commission 
will consider the options of unifying the Ortho-
dox Churches of various jurisdictions into one 
national Church, independent of the Moscow 
Patriarchate6. 
The UOC–MP has adopted a critical stance to-
wards Russian policy. The threats that Russian 
army  could officially enter Ukraine have also 
been sharply criticised, and demands have 
been made for Patriarch Kirill to intervene 
in this case. One manifestation of this was 
a letter from Metropolitan Onufry to the pa-
triarch, containing an appeal to influence the 
Russian government and prevent bloodshed7. 
Furthermore, the press secretary of the UOC–
MP, Georgi Kovalenko, has announced that by 
deciding to launch its intervention in Ukraine, 
the Russian government is violating the Ten 
Commandments. He has also warned the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church leader that if Kirill sup-
ports Russian aggression towards Ukraine, the 
Ukrainian Church will turn its back on him. 
He has further emphasised that the clergy of 
the UOC–MP are above all Ukrainian citizens8. 
As the fighting in south-eastern Ukraine esca-
lated, on 9 July Metropolitan Onufry signed an 
appeal on behalf of the Council of Churches and 
Religious Organisations of Ukraine, of which he 
is the chairman, to the Russia-supported rebels 
6 For more see http://pravoslavie.fm/articles/1460/1376/, 
accessed on 16 July 2014.
7 Letter from Metropolitan Onufry to Patriarch Kirill, 
1 March 2014, http://www.pravmir.ru/mitropolit-cher-
novickij-Onufryij-prosit-patriarxa-kirilla-ne-dopus-
tit-krovoprolitiya-v-ukraine/
8 Statement of 2 March 2014, http://lenta.ru/news/2014/ 
03/02/bulletinabible/
to lay down their weapons and stop the blood-
shed. The persecution and discrimination of 
certain religious groups in the areas controlled 
by the militants was firmly condemned in this 
appeal. It was also stated in the appeal that 
a territorial division of Ukraine would be a sin 
against God and future generations9. 
On the other hand, some of the UOC–MP cler-
gy have supported the actions taken by Russia 
and the separatists, although their number 
has been falling as the conflict has escalated. 
The Russian-language media have published 
announcements made by several UOC–MP cler-
gymen who had escaped to Russia and were 
criticising the new government in Kyiv from 
there10. Publicity has been given to cases when 
clergymen from the UOC–MP supported the 
pro-Russian rebels and blessed the flags of the 
so-called separatist republics of Donetsk and 
Luhansk. These incidents have seriously af-
fected the image of the UOC–MP and under-
mined respect for it among Ukrainian society. 
As a consequence, some of the Ukrainian pub-
lic were opposed to the visit by Patriarch Kirill, 
the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, to 
Kyiv to celebrate the anniversary of the Bap-
tism of Rus’11. Kirill’s closest aide, Metropol-
itan Illarion, the chairman of the Department 
of External Church Relations, was denied entry 
to Ukraine12. There have also been cases when 
whole parishes of the UOC–MP accepted the ju-
risdiction of the non-canonical Kyiv Patriarchate 
Church, which is the main ‘competitor’ for 
the UOC–MP in Ukraine.
9 For more see http://www.klikovo.ru/db/msg/29295, 
accessed on 4 August 2014
10 For example, protoiereus (protopriest) Andrey Novik-
ov, the secretary of the eparchy in Odessa, has talked 
to the Russian press about prosecutions against the 
clergy and members of the Moscow Patriarchate 
in Ukraine. For more see http://www.rg.ru/2014/04/11/
svashennik-site-anons.html and http://www.vz.ru/
world/2014/4/15/682187.html, accessed on 14 July 2014.
11 Russia Today, 19 June 2014, http://russian.rt.com/arti-
cle/37190 The visit did not take place. The Moscow Patriar-
chate has denied that such a visit had been planned at all.
12 Illarion was denied entry to Ukraine on 9 May at Dnipro-
petrovsk airport. 
There have also been cases when whole 
parishes of the UOC–MP accepted the ju-
risdiction of the non-canonical Kyiv Patri-
archate Church, which is the main ‘com-
petitor’ for the UOC–MP in Ukraine.
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The Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriar-
chate (UOC–KP) is the second largest religious 
community in the country. It comprises around 
4000 parishes and has between four and eight 
million members. These are approximate esti-
mates. According to most recent surveys, the 
current number of members of the UOC–KP has 
increased significantly in connection with the 
Ukrainian crisis (see the Appendix). The UOC–KP 
emerged in 1992, when a group of the clergy 
separated from the UOC–MP and founded their 
own Church. The UOC–KP has not been granted 
autocephaly as yet, and still has the status of 
a non-canonical Church, i.e. it is not recognised 
as legitimate by the other Orthodox Churches. 
Since its foundation it has been headed by the 
Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret, who is fostering 
the idea that the various branches of Ukrainian 
Orthodoxy should become united into one na-
tional Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Clergymen 
representing this Church held religious services 
during the protests on the Maidan which began 
last November, and since the fighting in east-
ern Ukraine escalated, the UOC–KP has consist-
ently defended the Ukrainian national interest, 
and claimed that it is necessary to maintain 
the territorial integrity of Ukraine and to resist 
Moscow’s imperial aspirations. The UOC–KP’s 
hierarchs have called upon all other Ukrainian 
Orthodox Churches to unite their structures 
in Ukraine and form a national Church together. 
The Russian Church’s reactions 
to the Ukrainian crisis
The Russian Orthodox Church has found itself 
in a difficult position due to the aggressive pol-
icy adopted by the Kremlin towards Ukraine. 
To minimise the negative impact of this poli-
cy on the ROC’s interests in Ukraine, the head 
of the Russian Church, Patriarch Kirill, has at-
tempted to prevaricate, and has engaged in ef-
forts at diplomacy. Being aware of the complex 
dependences between the various branches of 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Kirill has made cautious 
and evasive statements while referring to the 
Maidan protests and the fighting in eastern 
Ukraine. He has made attempts to distance 
the ROC from the Kremlin’s policy and not to 
take sides in the conflict, and he has appealed 
for peace. However, he has not officially con-
demned the Kremlin’s policy; he has not op-
posed Russia’s possible official military inter-
vention in Ukraine, nor has he protested against 
the annexation of Crimea. 
Firstly, one of the ROC’s problems is the fact 
that the members of the Ukrainian Church 
which it is a part, have found themselves on 
different sides of the barricades. One part of 
the UOC–MP’s clergy and congregation mem-
bers were present on the Maidan, and later crit-
icised the Russian-backed separatists and firmly 
opposed the entry of Russian troops to Ukraine. 
On the other hand, publicity has been given to 
cases where representatives of the clergy and 
lay members of the UOC–MP criticised the new 
government in Kyiv and openly backed the sep-
aratists. However, as the conflict has escalated, 
their number has been shrinking. If the ROC 
came down on one side or another, the divides 
within the UOC–MP could deepen, and result 
in some Orthodox Christians leaving the Church 
linked to Moscow and joining the Churches of 
other jurisdictions on a mass scale, the first 
symptoms of which are already visible. 
Secondly, the stance adopted by the Russian 
Church on the Ukrainian conflict has been 
conditioned by its close links with the Krem-
lin. These links have offered the Church tangi-
ble benefits, including prestige and funding. 
However, the price the ROC has to pay for this 
is its subordination to the Russian government. 
If the ROC were to adopt an independent and 
To minimise the negative impact of this 
policy on the ROC’s interests in Ukraine, 
the head of the Russian Church, Patriarch 
Kirill, has attempted to prevaricate, and 
has engaged in efforts at diplomacy.
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critical stance with regard to the Kremlin, this 
would mean breaking the rules of the deal be-
tween ‘the altar and the throne’, and the ROC 
is not ready to make this move. 
Given the dependences as outlined above, 
it took Kirill a long time to express an opinion 
on the Maidan protests. In one of his first of-
ficial comments on the issue this January, he 
stated that the ROC had never identified itself 
with any geopolitical project. At the same time, 
he cautioned the Orthodox clergy in Ukraine 
against becoming engaged in the protests: 
“The Church may not be directed by any polit-
ical agenda. If clergymen who incite the public 
come to the barricades, they are not bringing 
the message of the Church.”13
In response to the escalation of tensions in 
eastern Ukraine, Kirill stated in his diplomatic 
answer to the aforementioned letter from Met-
ropolitan Onufry on 2 March that he would 
make efforts to influence representatives of the 
Russian government to prevent the bloodshed. 
However, he did not condemn the intention 
to bring Russian troops to Ukraine. Instead he 
once again emphasised the ROC’s neutrality: 
“Members of our Church in Ukraine hold differ-
ent political views and beliefs and are standing 
today on the different sides of the barricade. 
The Church does not take sides in the political 
struggle. Its task is to take care of all those who have 
been exposed to violence (…)”14. In subsequent 
statements concerning the situation in Ukraine, 
he has appealed for peace and dialogue.
13 An interview for Rossiya Segodnya news agency, 7 January 
2014, http://www.pravmir.ru/patriarx-kirill-na-ukraine-my- 
vidim-revolyucionnuyu-situaciyu/
14 Patriarch Kirill’s statement on Ukraine, 2 March 2014, 
http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/3/2/675113.html
The fact that Kirill did not attend the official 
ceremony of Crimea’s incorporation into the 
Russian Federation at the Kremlin on 18 March 
this year was a meaningful sign. The absence of 
the head of Russian Orthodoxy during what the 
Kremlin and the Russian public saw as a solemn 
and very important ceremony was conspicuous, 
especially as Kirill had participated in all major 
state events and had been building up an im-
age of a mediator between the public and the 
government for the past five years, since he be-
came the head of the ROC15. Considering the 
close relations between the Kremlin and the 
ROC, it can be assumed that his absence was 
a tactical solution consulted with the Kremlin. 
Another symptomatic fact was that the ROC 
did not take direct control over the parishes 
in Crimea following Russia’s annexation of the 
peninsula, which still remain under the admin-
istrative supervision of the UOC–MP based in 
Kyiv. A similar situation was seen after the Rus-
sian-Georgian conflict in 2008; the Moscow 
Patriarchate did not take control over Ortho-
doxy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which still 
remain under the jurisdiction of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church. However, it must be empha-
sised that Patriarch Kirill has never condemned 
the annexation of Crimea, although representa-
tives of the UOC–MP and most members of the 
Orthodox community in Ukraine would have 
expected him to. 
Another meaningful fact was that Kirill did not 
come to Kyiv to attend the funeral of Metro-
politan Volodymyr, the head of the UOC–MP, 
who died on 5 July. Given the tense political 
relations between Ukraine and Russia, he did 
not wish to provoke any anti-Russian or anti- 
-Church reactions by his visit. His fears were 
well-grounded; Kirill’s pastoral visits to Ukraine 
had raised controversies among Ukrainian pub-
lic opinion in the past. In addition to religious 
goals, these visits were also intended to serve 
15 One manifestation of these aspirations was his reaction 
to the mass civil protests in Russia in late 2011/early 
2012, when he backed the protesters and appealed to 
the government for dialogue in one of his speeches. 
During the ceremony commemorating 
Saint Sergius of Radonezh, which was 
also attended by President Vladimir Putin, 
the Patriarch appealed to global public 
opinion not to view Russia as an aggressor.
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political and PR purposes; they were intended 
to demonstrate the supremacy of the Moscow 
Patriarchate over Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and 
contribute to building closer political relations 
between Russia and Ukraine.16
Kirill’s address on 18 July during the ceremo-
ny commemorating Saint Sergius of Radonezh, 
which was also attended by President Vladimir 
Putin, marked an important moment. The Pa-
triarch appealed to global public opinion not 
to view Russia as an aggressor: “God grant that 
Russia be understood today by those who still do 
not understand it. God grant that everyone un-
derstand that Russia is not a source of a military 
or any other threat to humanity.”17 In addition to 
this, Kirill thanked Putin for the expression of the 
“consensus seen at present among the Russians” 
and for “formulating thoughts and ideas which 
unite people”.18 Reactions from Ukrainian and 
Western public opinion indicate that this appeal 
was viewed as a manifestation of conformism. 
The ‘Russian World’ – one idea, 
two interpretations
The Russian Orthodox Church has been inten-
sively co-operating with Russian political lead-
ers over the past few years19, and their mutual 
relations are increasingly close. Russian foreign 
policy, especially with regard to the former Sovi-
et republics which share a similar culture, above 
all Ukraine, has been one of the main areas of 
this co-operation. The converging interests of 
the two sides are the main reason for their col-
laboration: the ROC sees Ukraine as part of the 
16 In 2013, these goals were inherent in the celebration of 
the 1025th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’, which was 
used by Moscow Patriarchate and the political leaders of 
Russia to reinforce their influence in Ukraine. For more 
see T. Iwański, K. Jarzyńska, ‘Russian-Ukrainian tensions 
with the anniversary of the Christianisation of Kyivan Rus 
in the background’, EastWeek, OSW, 7 August 2013
17 For more see http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news& 
div=55957, accessed on 5 August 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 Co-operation between the ROC and the Kremlin began 
to intensify towards the end of Patriarch Aleksei’s pri-
macy (2008).
Russian Orthodoxy’s ‘canonical territory’20, and 
claims the right to control it. For its part, the 
Kremlin views this area as its natural zone of 
political influence. One consequence of this is 
that Moscow has never stopped challenging 
the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. Both 
the Church and the Kremlin want to strength-
en their influence in Ukraine, and in the longer 
run to consolidate the Orthodox and Rus-
sian-speaking population under the religious 
and political aegis of Moscow. While develop-
ing their co-operation over the past few years, 
the two sides have drawn upon the concept 
of the ‘Russian World’ (in Russian: Russky Mir) 
popularised by the Church. However, Moscow’s 
aggressive policy towards Ukraine has revealed 
significant differences in the interpretations of 
this idea by the Church and the Kremlin, and 
has laid bare the conflict over which methods 
should be used to implement this idea. 
The Orthodox Church sees the idea of the ‘Rus-
sian World’ as rooted in the canonical concept, 
according to which all believers are part of one 
Church and one ‘Orthodox nation’21. This con-
cept is linked to the Church’s sense of mission. 
20 The ‘canonical territory’ as understood by the ROC is 
its natural area of influence extending over the coun-
tries inhabited by Orthodox people, above all Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. This term appeared 
in the Russian public space in its present meaning in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. It is believed that Patriarch 
Kirill, who was the head of the Department of External 
Church Relations at that time, popularised this term. 
21 This notion appears in the document ‘The Foundations of 
the Social Concept of the ROC’, which sets the principles 
of relations between the Church and the state, and deter-
mines the ROC’s attitude towards social issues. It mentions 
the nation as a congregation of faith, the ‘Orthodox nation.’ 
Moscow’s aggressive policy towards 
Ukraine has revealed significant differ-
ences in the interpretations of this idea 
by the Church and the Kremlin, and has 
laid bare the conflict over which methods 
should be used to implement this idea.
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In the ROC’s interpretation, the term ‘Russian 
World’ extends above all to those areas which 
once belonged to the historical ‘Holy Rus’, i.e. 
also to Ukraine and Belarus, apart from Russia. 
The ROC’s leaders have already drawn upon the 
‘Russian World’ concept for a long time, and 
used the rhetoric of the unity of the ‘fraternal’ 
Slavonic nations to entrench the Moscow Patri-
archate’s influence in this area. To promote this 
idea in Ukraine, they have principally employed 
the popularisation of the traditional Christian 
values and Orthodox identity, pastoral work, and 
strengthening their informal influence on the 
hierarchs of the UOC–MP. One example of this 
activity was the frequent pastoral visits Patriarch 
Kirill paid to the congregation in Ukraine. During 
these visits he appealed for the unity of Ortho-
doxy, obviously under Moscow’s leadership. 
In the Kremlin’s interpretation, the ‘Russian 
World’ idea is above all a geopolitical concept 
which it employs to provide grounds for Russia’s 
imperialistic aspirations with regard to its neigh-
bours – first of all the countries which emerged 
in the post-Soviet area. When Vladimir Putin re-
sumed the presidency in 2012, he adapted the 
Church’s concept of the ‘Russian World’ as the 
foundation of the new Russian state ideology22, 
and turned the ROC into an instrument of Rus-
sia’s political influence on the neighbouring 
 
22 For more see M. Menkiszak, ‘The Putin doctrine: 
The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian 
dominance in the post-Soviet area’, OSW Commentary, 
27 March 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-forma-
tion-a-conceptual-framework-russian
countries, especially Ukraine23. However, Putin 
has broadened the interpretation of this idea 
to adjust it to his political aspirations, and also 
added new elements to it. Apart from the ap-
peal for unity of the ‘Orthodox nation’, he has in-
corporated slogans concerning the uniqueness 
of Russian civilisation, the common historical, 
cultural and linguistic legacy of the residents of 
this area, as well as anti-Western slogans in the 
idea of the ‘Russian World’. By annexing Crime-
an and unofficially supporting the separatists in 
south-eastern Ukraine, Russia’s political leaders 
have proven that in order to implement their 
concept of the ‘Russian World’ as they see it, 
they are ready to resort to aggressive media 
propaganda, foment public unrest and even 
violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity using mili-
tary means. By broadening the ‘Russian World’ 
concept, while employing methods which the 
ROC as a religious institution cannot openly 
approve of24 to put this concept into practice, 
the Kremlin is de facto distorting the idea of 
the ‘Russian World’ in its original version, and 
is discrediting the ROC in the eyes of the Ortho-
dox community in Ukraine. 
Judging from the reactions of Ukrainian public 
opinion, the Kremlin’s policy under the slogan 
of consolidating the ‘Russian World’ is having 
detrimental effects from the ROC’s point of 
view. This policy has been thwarting the ROC’s 
efforts to reinforce its public position in Ukraine, 
and is provoking anti-Russian sentiments 
among Orthodox Ukrainians. This is because 
the external threat from Russia has served as 
a catalyst, consolidating a great part of the 
23 For more see A. Bogomolov, O. Lytvynenko, ‘A Ghost 
in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine’, Briefing 
Paper, Chatham House, 1 January 2012, http://www.
chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/181667
24 The words of protoiereus Vsevolod Chaplin, who is 
known for his pro-Kremlin views, have given rise to 
much controversy in circles linked to the Church in 
Ukraine when expressing his approval for the Russian 
possible official military intervention in Ukraine and 
claiming that the entry of Russian troops could be seen 
as “Russia’s peacekeeping and civilisational mission”. 
For more see Interfax-Religion, 1 March 2014, http://
www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=54620
In the Kremlin’s interpretation, the ‘Rus-
sian World’ idea is above all a geopoliti-
cal concept which it employs to provide 
grounds for Russia’s imperialistic aspira-
tions with regard to its neighbours.
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Ukrainian public against the Russian aggressor25. 
The image of Russia as the enemy also encom-
passes the ROC and Patriarch Kirill, who are as-
sociated with the Kremlin. 
The Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian 
support for the militants from the so-called sep-
aratist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk have 
led to a situation where the new government 
in Kyiv – a city of utmost importance for the 
Russian Church since its time  as the cradle of 
eastern Christianity – has set itself the goal of 
leaving the Kremlin’s area of influence. On the 
other hand, the confrontational stance adopted 
in the Ukrainian conflict indicates that Russia’s 
current goal is to destabilise Ukraine and cause 
its division, which will in practice also lead to 
a disintegration of the ‘Russian World’.
Challenges to the Russian 
Orthodox Church 
The Russian Orthodox Church’s reaction to 
Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine has proven 
that it is not an independent social actor, but in-
stead is dependent on the Kremlin’s decisions. 
Even in a situation when the ROC is sustaining 
losses due to the Russian government’s policy, 
it is unable to oppose the Kremlin, due to the 
still considerable benefits which it derives from 
its co-operation with the state. The stance 
which the ROC has adopted indicates that the 
Church attaches a greater value to its role in 
the authoritarian government system in Rus-
sia than to its religious activity, and is ready 
to play this role in accordance with scenarios 
created by President Putin and his aides, while 
merely creating the appearance of neutrality. 
25 Proof of a significant deterioration in Ukrainian at-
titudes towards Russians include the tone of public 
discourse in the media and social networks, and the 
results of public opinion polls, for example one con-
ducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociol-
ogy (data as of 17 June 2014, http://www.kiis.com.
ua/?lang=rus&cat=news&id=348&page=1) and Pew 
Global Attitudes (data as of 7 July 2014, http://www.
pewglobal.org/2014/07/09/russias-global-image-nega-
tive-amid-crisis-in-ukraine/)
The ROC is thus losing its opportunity to build 
up respect among the believers as an independ-
ent religious organisation protecting Christian 
values. 
Therefore, even if the Kremlin attempts to use 
the Russian Church more actively to lobby for 
its interests in Ukraine, as it did in the past, the 
ROC’s reliability and effectiveness will be limit-
ed: firstly, due to the negative emotions which 
the ROC raises among the Ukrainian public, 
as an institution linked to the Kremlin; and sec-
ondly, due to the fact that the ROC’s instruments 
of influence on the Ukrainian Church have weak-
ened. The weakening of the Ukrainian UOC–MP 
social position and the intensification of its ef-
forts to gain independence from Moscow will 
mean that the ROC is losing its informal influence 
on the hierarchs of the UOC–MP, which have thus 
far been employed as an instrument for influenc-
ing Ukraine’s domestic policy.
The Kremlin’s aggressive policy towards 
Ukraine, which the ROC sees as part of the ‘Rus-
sian World’, has placed new serious challenges 
in front of the ROC. Firstly, as a consequence 
of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the 
ROC is being treated by the Ukrainian public 
with increasing hostility, since it is viewed as 
the Kremlin’s political instrument and an ally 
of the Russian aggressor, and not as a neutral 
religious institution, and this is having a detri-
mental effect on the UOC–MP’s image. These 
sentiments are already causing difficulty in con-
tacts between the Moscow Patriarchate and 
the UOC–MP on the social and institutional lev-
els. There is risk that the hierarchs of the ROC, 
Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Illarion, would 
become personae non gratae in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s policy under the slogan 
of consolidating the ‘Russian World’ is 
having detrimental effects from the ROC’s 
point of view
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Secondly, Moscow’s aggressive policy is make-
ing it more likely that the Ukrainian Orthodoxy 
will strive for independence from the Moscow 
Patriarchate, as a result of a stronger desire for 
emancipation within the UOC–MP on the one 
hand, and on the other an increase in public re-
spect for its competitor, the UOC–KP. From the 
ROC’s point of view, this would mean the loss 
of part of its ‘canonical territory’, and thus the 
failure of the ‘Russian World’ concept it pro-
motes – without Orthodox Ukraine, this project 
will never be completed. If the ROC loses juris-
diction over the Ukrainian Orthodoxy which it 
has controlled thus far, its position in the glob-
al Orthodox community could be undermined. 
For ages the Moscow Patriarchate has as-
pired to historical and religious primacy over 
the entire Orthodox Church, and sees itself as 
a successor to the Eastern Christian tradition26. 
Therefore, in the face of the Ukrainian conflict, 
Kirill has distanced himself from the Kremlin’s 
actions so as not to add fuel to the process of 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s consolidation outside 
Moscow, while at the same time blocking the 
formal mechanisms for granting autocephaly 
to any of the non-canonical Ukrainian Church-
es. Kirill achieved a great diplomatic success 
as regards this issue, when he tactically forced 
the global Orthodox community to make the 
assurance that the issue of granting auto-
cephaly to the independent Ukrainian Church 
would in fact not be raised during the Pan- 
-Orthodox Council in Istanbul planned for 201627. 
 
26 The ROC has used the concept of ‘the Third Rome’ as 
a justification for these aspirations. However, the histor-
ic Kievan metropolis is the cradle of Eastern Christianity. 
Kiev, the site of the Baptism of Rus’, lost its significance as 
a consequence of the division of Russia into districts and of 
the Mongol invasion. In 1325, the metropolitan office was 
moved to Moscow. In 1448, the Orthodox centre in Mos-
cow was granted autocephaly and thus became independ-
ent of Constantinople. Since this happened just ahead of 
the fall of Byzantium, Moscow began to claim the right to 
be called ‘The Third Rome’. The reconstructed Kievan me-
tropolis accepted Moscow’s supremacy in 1686.
27 Patriarch Kirill has been assured that all decisions during the 
Pan-Orthodox Council will be taken in consensus. It will be 
impossible to recognise the independence of the Ukraini-
an autocephaly without official consent from the Moscow 
Patriarchate, from which it would have to formally separate. 
However, one of Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches 
(or a united national Church) could gain recog-
nition through the renewal of the historic au-
tocephaly of the Kievan metropolis, and not by 
gaining a new autocephaly. Therefore, what the 
Moscow Patriarchate sees as a negative scenar-
io, i.e. the loss of its honorary superiority over 
part of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, is still possible28.
Thirdly, the Russian intervention in Ukraine 
is cooling relations between the ROC and the 
Catholic Church. Furthermore, the percep-
tion of the Orthodox Church as the Kremlin’s 
‘ideological department’ is being entrenched in 
the West. The ROC’s relations with the Vatican 
have improved over the past few years, which 
has also been a result of the Kremlin’s politi-
cal calculations29. One sign that these relations 
have seriously deteriorated is the statement 
by Metropolitan Illarion in an interview for 
the National Catholic Register30, in which he ac-
cused the Vatican of fomenting tension among 
the Orthodox people in Ukraine and acting to 
the detriment of the ROC. He placed the blame 
for the conflict in Ukraine on Greek Catholics, 
who are supported by the Vatican and the West, 
and who, in the ROC’s opinion, “have embarked 
upon a crusade against it.” The Metropolitan 
added that the Patriarch of Moscow would 
not meet Pope Francis in the immediate future 
for this reason31. This anti-Catholic and anti- 
-Western stance adopted by the ROC coincides 
with the narrative of the Russian government, 
which has been consistently blaming the West 
for the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine.
28 In the symbolic hierarchy of the Orthodox Churches, 
the historic Kievan metropolis would have a higher posi-
tion than the Moscow Patriarchate.
29 For more see K. Jarzyńska, W. Rodkiewicz, ‘Putin 
u Papieża: ideologia i polityka’, Tydzień na Wschodzie, 
OSW, 27 November 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2013-11-27/putin-u-papieza-ideolo-
gia-i-polityka
30 National Catholic Register, ‘The Pan-Orthodox Council, 
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APPENDIX
Declared membership of the Orthodox Church in Ukrainian society
70% of Ukrainians declare themselves as members of the Orthodox Church, including (%)
2013 2014
Members of the UOC–MP 27.7 25
Members of the UOC–KP 25.9 32
Followers of the Orthodox reli-
gion, without being identified 
with any Orthodox Church
40.8 40
Data: Razumkov Centre, April 2014, 
http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/socpolls.php?cat_id=93













Very important 26.3 56.0 11.1 18.6 20.1
Quite important 34.5 25.7 41.7 36.3 34.7
Not very important 26.5 13.7 27.3 31.5 31.5
Does not matter 12.8 4.6 19.9 13.5 13.6
Data: World Value Survey 2010-2014,
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp
